Appraisal theories of emotion

Appraisal theories of emotion In 1884, William James asked, What is an emotion? (James, 1884), and researchers are still pondering, arguing, debating, and providing evidence to give a coherent answer. Although these is no consensus concerning the definition or exact nature of emotion, the componential theories of emotions, which stipulate that emotions can be identified and differentiated from each other on the basis of specific patterns of components, have gained widespread acceptance. Within this approach, the cognitive appraisal theories have been among the most influential. These theories postulate that the elicitation and differentiation of emotions is based upon a process of cognitive evaluations or appraisals, and each of the theorists (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1968; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) proposes that emotional experience corresponds to a particular pattern of values on these dimensions. Appraisal researchers have provided evidence that there exist some strong, reliable, and clear links between specific cognitive evaluations or appraisal patterns and the experience of particular emotions (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, 1991; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith, Heynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). For example, fear / anxiety can been associated with evaluating one's situation as threatening; sadness with helplessness in an undesirable situation where there is little or no hope of improvement; anger with blaming someone else for an undesirable situation; and guilt with blaming oneself (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Although appraisal theorists share many of the same basic assumptions about emotions, there are also important differences and points of disagreement (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001). A detailed description of these similarities and differences, however, is beyond the scope of this review. Because this research was conducted based upon the appraisal theory proposed by Scherer (1984, 1988, 1993, 2001), we will briefly 10 describe his Component Process Model (CPM) in the following section. References to other appraisal approaches throughout the review will be made when these theories or the research evidence provide relevant complements or oppositions to the work we are proposing. Scherer views emotions as “the interface between an organism and its environment mediating between constantly changing situations and events and the individual’s behavior responses” (Scherer, 1984, pp. 295). He postulates that a particular emotion state is the result of a process of cognitive evaluation, which takes the form of a rapidly and hierarchically structured sequence of stimulus processing steps. The conviction that the process must necessarily be hierarchical and sequential is based upon the premise that if the function of an emotion is to act as a mechanism for survival, then the individual must evaluate those criteria which are essential for his or her survival first, in order to prepare for possible emergency action. In the most recent model shown in Table 1.1, Scherer (2001) proposes that an individual will evaluate information pertaining to four major classes, each composed of several sub-checks. Table 1.1: The appraisal dimensions postulated by Scherer (2001) 1. Relevance Detection a.) Novelty (suddenness, familiarity, predictability) b.) Intrinsic Pleasantness c.) Goal Relevance 2. Implication Assessment a.) Causal Attribution b.) Outcome Probability Check c.) Discrepancy from Expectation d.) Goal/Need Conduciveness e.) Urgency 3. Coping Potential Determination a.) Control b.) Power c.) Adjustment 4. Normative Significance Evaluation a.) Internal Standards b.) External Standards Given the almost infinite number of stimuli in the environment, individuals must first decide which ones are relevant for their physical or psychological well-being before choosing to act. A relevance detection check is therefore the first in a sequence of cognitive appraisals. 11 Once the importance for the self has been established, the individual must evaluate the implications of the event, to decide the level of importance in terms of personal well-being and long-term or short term goals. Third, the individual must decide whether he or she can cope with the event or situation. Finally, the individual will be able to evaluate the significance of the event in terms of his or her self-concept and as well as social norms and values. These stimulus evaluation checks (SEC) are thought to occur very rapidly, at conscious and unconscious levels, and are entirely subjective. According to Scherer, each consecutive SEC outcome pattern differentiates one emotion state from another. In other words, there are essentially as many different emotion states as there are combinations of cognitive appraisal check outcomes. The reason we can often identify the states into large seemingly basic emotion categories such as anger, sadness and joy, is that many of the appraisal checks are evaluated in similar ways for these emotions. In particular, certain situations or behavior patterns will be appraised in similar ways by different individuals within the same culture due to such factors as the inherent qualities of the situation or social convention. For example, most people will judge the weather to be an inherently uncontrollable event and tying one's shoe a highly controllable event. That loosing a friend is an unpleasant event and that winning the lottery a pleasant event. In addition, one would (at least in western culture) most likely attach a label such as sadness to the emotional experience of loosing a friend and a label such as happiness to the emotional experience of winning the lottery. In reality, however, the sadness experienced by one person will probably be very different to the sadness of another and the reported emotions for this event (loosing a friend) could be a wide range of terms such as: devastated, hopeless, angry, full of sorrow, grief, depressed, etc. Appraisal theories provide an integrative framework for the understanding of emotion, and not only describe emotions, but also attempt to explain them, making them particularly useful for testing predictions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Most of the evidence to support appraisal dimensions proposed by appraisal theories has been obtained through verbal self-report (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Gehm & Scherer, 1988; Roseman et al., 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Typically, participants are asked to recall situations in which they experienced a particular emotion, or to imagine particular emotion events, or to read carefully designed two-by-two vignettes, and then to describe their 12 evaluations of the situation based upon questionnaires containing the appraisal dimensions of interest. The patterns from this type of research are quite robust, as indicated by the replication of results, and some studies have shown that appraisal patterns converge across different cultures (Scherer, 1997). Despite growing empirical evidence demonstrating the theoretical and practical usefulness of appraisal theories for the understanding of emotions (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), there are also strong criticisms of this approach (e.g., Berkowitz, 1994; Parkinson, 1999; Zajonc, 1980, 1984). For example, because individuals often report on both their appraisals and their emotions at a given time, some authors suggest that the resulting appraisal profiles correspond more closely to emotion schemas than to emotion antecedent cognitions (Parkinson & Manstead, 1992, 1993). The critics argue that these studies are not examining appraisal processes related to emotions, but descriptions of real or imagined emotions, which are based on extensive reappraising and the reliance on culturally or personally relevant stereotypes (Parkinson, 1999). To address these concerns, some researchers have used naturally occurring events, or induced emotions experimentally and tested appraisals processes as they occur (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Scherer & Ceshi, 1997; Scherer & Tannenbaum, 1986; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). A further test of the theory would be to use an ecologically valid emotion induction method, to assess appraisal and emotions processes during the emotion induction situation (“on-line”), and to demonstrate that the appraisal and emotion reports are not only consistent with the demands of the situation, but can also be predicted by stable individual differences. In this way, it could be demonstrated that appraisal is not only a product of culturally or socially accepted scripts as required by the situation, but are also due to personally meaningful evaluations of the situation.