Applied Research in Cognitive Psychology
Applied Research in Cognitive Psychology For many psychologists, the desire to “know about knowing” is sufficient reason to study human cognition; however, there are more tangible benefits. Examples of these widespread practical applications may be found in the fields of artificial intelligence, law, and in the everyday world of decision making. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a branch of computer science that strives to create a computer capable of reasoning, processing language, and, in short, mimicking human intelligence. While this goal has yet to be obtained in full, research in this area has made important contributions. The search for AI has improved the understanding of human cognition; it has also produced applied benefits such as expert systems. Expert systems are computer programs that simulate human expertise in specific domains. Such programs have been painstakingly developed by computer scientists who have essentially extracted knowledge in a subject area from a human expert and built it into a computer system designed to apply that knowledge. Expert systems do not qualify as true artificial intelligence, because, while they can “think,” they can only do so very narrowly, on one particular topic. A familiar expert system is the “chess computer.” A computerized chess game is driven by a program that has a vast storehouse of chess knowledge and the capability of interacting with a human player, “thinking” about each game in which it is involved. Expert systems are also employed to solve problems in law, computer programming, and various facets of industry. A medical expert system has even been developed to consult interactively with patients and to diagnose and recommend a course of treatment for infectious diseases. The cognitive research of Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues at the University of Washington demonstrates the shortcomings of human long-term memory. This research is relevant to the interpretation of eyewitness testimony in the courtroom. In one study, Loftus and John Palmer showed their subjects films of automobile accidents and asked them to estimate the speeds of the cars involved. The critical variable was the verb used in the question to the subjects. That is, they were asked how fast the cars were going when they “smashed,” “collided,” “bumped,” “hit,” or “contacted” each other. Interestingly, the stronger the verb, the greater was the speed estimated. One interpretation of these findings is that the nature of the “leading question” biased the answers of subjects who were not really positive of the cars’ speeds. Hence, if the question employed the verb “smashed,” the subject was led to estimate that the cars were going fast. Any astute attorney would have no trouble capitalizing on this phenomenon when questioning witnesses to a crime or accident. In a second experiment, Loftus and Palmer considered a different explanation for their findings. Again, subjects saw filmed car accidents and were questioned as to the speeds of the cars, with the key verb being varied as previously described. As before, those exposed to the verb “smashed” estimated the fastest speeds. In the second part of the experiment, conducted a week later, the subjects were asked additional questions about the accident, including, “Did you see any broken glass?” Twenty percent of the subjects reported seeing broken glass, though none was in the film. Of particular interest was that the majority of those who made this error were in the group that had been exposed to the strongest verb, “smashed.” Loftus and Palmer reasoned that the subjects were melding actual information that they had witnessed with information from another source encountered after the fact (the verb “smashed” presented by the questioner). The result was a mental representation of an event that was partly truth and partly fiction. This interpretation has implications for the evaluation of eyewitness testimony. Before testifying in court, a witness will likely have been questioned numerous times (and received many suggestions as to what may have taken place) and may even have compared notes with other witnesses. This process is likely to distort the originally experienced information. Consider next the topic of decision making, an area of research in cognitive psychology loaded with practical implications. Everyone makes scores of decisions on a daily basis, from choosing clothing to match the weather to selecting a college or a career objective. Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman are well known for their research on decision making and, in particular, on the use of heuristics. Heuristics are shortcuts or rules of thumb that are likely, but not guaranteed, to produce a correct decision. It would seem beneficial for everyone to appreciate the limitations of such strategies. For example, the availability heuristic often leads people astray when their decisions involve the estimating of probabilities, as when faced with questions such as, Which produces more fatalities, breast cancer or diabetes? Which are more numerous in the English language, words that begin with k or words that have k as the third letter? Experimental subjects typically, and incorrectly, choose the first alternative. Kahneman and Tversky’s research indicates that people rely heavily on examples that come most easily to mind—that is, the information most available in memory. Hence, people overestimate the incidence of breast-cancer fatalities because such tragedies get more media attention relative to diabetes, a more prolific but less exotic killer. In a similar vein, words that begin with k come to mind more easily (probably because people are more likely to organize their vocabularies by the initial sounds of the words) than words with k as the third letter, although the latter, in fact, outnumber the former. One’s decision making will doubtless be improved if one is aware of the potential drawbacks associated with the availability heuristic and if one is able to resist the tendency to estimate probabilities based upon the most easily imagined examples.
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